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The Proliferating Sacred: Secularization and Postmodernity
Donald Surrency
ABSTRACT
When analyzing the role religion plays in contemporary American society, one is
forced to address the notion of secularization. This is a term that broadly refers to
the marginalization of religious influence in culture and society that began at the
outset of the Enlightenment, sometime during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but, as Peter Berger argues, can actually be traced back to the times of
the great Israelite prophets who emerged during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE).
Throughout the available literature, proponents of the secularization thesis extend
the marginalization of religious influence from the societal level to the level of
individual consciousness; however, this thesis contends that these analyses appear
to be inadequate in describing postmodern culture.
This thesis affirms Lyotard’s description of classifying postmodernity as a time
exhibiting “incredulity towards the meta-narrative.” Thus, this thesis will argue
that postmodern culture is not best described as secular. By employing Jacques
Ellul’s understanding of the sacred and Vincent Pecora’s “semantic resonance” of
religion, this thesis will provide a more adequate theoretic platform to develop
accounts for religion in postmodernity. Through analysis of various deployments
of the secularization thesis in the context of Ellul’s theory of the proliferating
ii

sacred, the adequacy of the available literature that examines secularization in
contemporary society will be evaluated. On the basis of this evaluation, proposals
for reconsideration of the secularization thesis will be offered.
Furthermore, this thesis will locate renditions of the sacred in postmodern society
through participation in traditional institutional religion and the proliferation of
New Religious Movements by employing a substantive approach. By taking a
functional approach, this thesis will analyze the religious dimensions of sports in
contemporary American culture. It will become evident that whether one
understands religion substantively or functionally, it is clear that the sacred in
postmodernity appears to be thriving rather than eroding. This thesis will
advocate a phenomenological functional understanding of religion and society
and support the astute observation made by Graham Ward in his recent work
Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory, that “Religion is once again
haunting the imagination of the West.”

iii

Introduction
When analyzing the role religion plays in contemporary American society, one is
forced to address the notion of secularization. This is a term that broadly refers to the
marginalization of religious influence in society that began at the outset of the
Enlightenment, sometime during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but, as both
Weber and Berger argue, can actually be traced back to the times of the great Israelite
prophets who emerged during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE).1 Literature that dealt with
the secularization thesis began to become popular during the 1950’s and 1960’s, but it is
still as controversial of a topic today as it was nearly a half century ago. The relevance of
secularization is evident by the fact that many works analyzing this process are still in
print years after publication, and by the constant release of new texts with either
“revised” theories, or counterarguments. Notable scholars, such as Peter Berger, Steve
Bruce, Karel Dobbelaere, Rodney Stark and Vincent Pecora can be found as staunch
supporters, and as strong critics.
In general, proponents of the secularization thesis argue that secularization is a
constant process, in which decline in individual religious participation is made evident by
pluralism and a decline in church attendance. On the other hand, critics of the
secularization thesis argue that individual religious participation is not in decline, and
pluralism is actually evidence of religious resurgence. When analyzing secularization
1

Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Anchor: 1967), 110125.
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literature, it becomes evident that proponents of the secularization thesis focus too much
on institutional religion (specifically Christianity), while critics of the secularization
thesis tend to only understand religion substantively. Moreover, while secularization
may effectively describe the role and status of religion in modernity,2 it does not appear
to be quite as accurate in its account of religion in postmodernity. In fact, as will be
elaborated shortly,3 my thesis will argue that postmodern culture is not best described as
secular, rather it is best described as religious.
Modernity is described by Steve Bruce as a time exhibiting “the industrialization
of work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small
community by the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and the
rationalization both of thought and social organization.”4 This seems to be an accurate
account of modernity, and in line with this description, for purposes of this thesis, three
main features of modernity will be presented, to provide a contrast for three main features
of postmodernity.
The first feature of modernity is the establishment of the metanarrative of
scientific progress. This is best described by Paul Lakeland when he writes:
The Enlightenment consolidated belief in the inviolablity of the Cartesian ego, put
its faith in human reason as the power of mastery over nature and fate, and thus
created the intellectual conditions of the explosion of science and technology—
the individual’s application of reason in order to subdue nature.5

2

It is important to note that, in following Meredith McGuire, secularization is one of four different
narratives that can describe religion in the modern period. The other three are: religious reorganization,
religious individualization, and religious economies. For further reading see Meredith McGuire and James
V. Spickard Religion in the Modern World.
3
See page 8.
4
Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, (Blackwell Publishing: 2002), 2.
5
Paul Lakeland, Postmodernity
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The second feature of modernity is a production-based culture system. The
Industrial Revolution, which started in Europe, spread throughout much of the West via
European colonialism. The guiding concept of western industrialization was production.
Inventions such as the flying shuttle, cotton gin, and interchangeable parts are examples
of the focus on production during this time period.6
The third feature of modernity is the marginalization of religion, or secularization.
With the establishment of science and reason as the metanarrative of modernity, the
metanarrative of pre-modern society, religion, was marginalized. Many scholars, such as
Peter Berger and Steve Bruce, argue that secularization is a concomitant to
modernization.7
Now that a general understanding of modernity has been established, a description
of postmodernity can be offered. While postmodern theory is extremely broad,
consisting of a wide array of theories, sometimes contradictory to one another, there do
seem to be three features common to most descriptions of postmodernity.
The first feature is the collapse of the metanarrative. A metanarrative is “. . . an
over-arching story which can supposedly account for, explain, or comment upon the
validity of all other stories, a universal or absolute set of truths which is supposed to
transcend social, institutional, or human limitations.”8 This collapse of metanarratives
proves to be a major rupture not just to the modern period, but to all of the epochs that
precede modernity. However, it is important to note that the collapse of the
6

For further reading on this feature of modernity, see Jean Baudrillard La societe de consummation (Paris:
Gallimard, 1970); Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York, N.Y.: BasicBooks,
1978) and Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1991).
7
For further reading, see Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy( Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books,1967) and
Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford Press, 1996)
8
Glenn Ward, Teach Yourself Postmodernism, McGraw Hill: 1997, 171.
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metanarrative does not mean the disappearance of metanarratives, it just means they seem
to function differently in a social environment. Rather than functioning as a “sacred
canopy” of society as a whole, to use Berger’s terminology, the metanarratives become
small “canopies” for particular groups or individuals. The collapse of the metanarrative
is especially notable in the case of the metanarratives of science, reason, and
nationalism.9
The second feature of postmodernity is the shift from the production-based
culture to a consumption-based culture system. This represents a significantly dissimilar
worldview than the worldview found in the dominating presence of Industrialization in
19th and early 20th century America. This fundamental shift in society is affirmed by Jean
Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson, and further deployed and examined by Dell deChant.10
The third feature of postmodernity is widespread religious resurgence. This
religious resurgence takes on the form of fundamentalism and traditionalism,
Pentecostalism, and various New Religious Movements in many parts of the world.
These forms of religion are predicated on a nostalgic, golden age myth that is witnessed
on a massive scale in the postmodern period.11
All three of these elements are critical, but the theory of metanarratives requires
special consideration. In this regard, Jean-François Lyotard’s description of

9

For further reading on this feature of postmodernity, see Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge ( Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota, 1984).
10
For further reading on this feature of postmodernity, see Jean Baudrillard La societe de consummation
(Paris: Gallimard, 1970); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991); and Dell deChant, The Sacred Santa: Religious Dimensions
of Consumer Culture (Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 2002).
11
For further reading on this feature of postmodernity, see Peter Berger (ed), The Desecularization of the
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999; and
Rodney Starke and William Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult
Formation (Los Angelas, California: University of California Press, 1985).
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postmodernity is foundational. In his work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge, Lyotard defines the postmodern as “incredulity toward metanarratives.”12
Lyotard argues that prior to the Enlightenment, the metanarrative of western society was
religion. From primal and archaic cultures, to 16th century Europe, religion was that set
of truths that transcended social limitations. However, the Enlightenment brought on the
social sciences and thus it produced faith in an entirely different metanarrative—science.
With the birth of the social sciences, religion was understood as superstitious and
pre-scientific. Glenn Ward explains Lyotard’s understanding of the metanarrative of
science by writing
between the Enlightenment and the mid-twentieth century, science justified itself
by claiming that it needed no justification. That is to say, it took advantage of the
idea that its activities were pursued in the name of the timeless metanarratives of
progress, emancipation, and knowledge. By appealing in this way to ideas whose
meanings are taken to be self-evident and universally agreed, science was able to
masquerade as a single project objectively carried out for the good of the human
race. Lyotard claims that since around the end of the Second World War, these
myths have collapsed.13
As a result, it is now difficult to equate scientific rationality with progress, and people
have grown suspicious of science just as they had grown suspicious of religion during the
Enlightenment. In this context, then, the study of religion in postmodernity is faced with
a different cultural situation than the study of religion in modernity. It is on this basis
that the fundamental line of inquiry in this thesis will be advanced.

12

Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, (University of Minnesota:
1984), xxiv.
13
Glenn Ward, 171-172. As a note, Lyotard feels this collapse is largely the result of techno-bureaucratic
society. Techno-bureaucracy separates the ends from the means while metanarratives do not. Thus, the
techno-bureaucratic society was the social cause of the collapse of the metanarrative, and World War II
(with the technical efficiency of Auschwitz and other death camps and the dropping of the atomic bomb)
was the psychological realization of this collapse of the metanarrative. It is also important to note that
many other theorists agree with Lyotard on this, including, but not limited to: Fredric Jameson, Jean
Baudrillard, Alasdair MacIntyre, Dell deChant, and Darrell Fasching.
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Of special note here is the relationship of the collapse of the metanarrative to
secularization theory. As will be made evident in Part I, proponents of the secularization
thesis (or believers in the secularization dogma) seem to be analyzing religion in
modernity. In the modern period, science and its myth of progress was the metanarrative
of the West; thus, as a component of society, religion had to answer to science. However,
after Auschwitz and Hiroshima, this metanarrative of scientific progress has been called
into question, thus the argument that religion must comply with scientific rationality in
contemporary society no longer seems plausible. With the metanarrative not functioning
as it has previously, there is no longer a single ground on which to base a critique of the
various components of society, including religion. This collapse of the metanarrative is
quintessential of the postmodern condition; therefore contemporary cultural criticism can
no longer strictly rely on science as the only viable grounds for analysis.
The understanding of religion deployed in this analysis of postmodernity is based
on the description of religion provided by Dell deChant in The Sacred Santa: Religious
Dimensions of Consumer Culture (2002). Particularly instructive is deChant’s elaboration
of Tillich’s ultimate concern concept. According to this description, religion imparts a
belief in an ultimate power that is reinforced communally through myths and rituals
while granting participants a degree of power over material conditions. For participants in
religion, all of this works “to supply them with answers to ultimate questions regarding
nature and the human condition.”14 This description places emphasis on the community
that establishes a meaning-producing order and helps answer questions of ultimate
concern. It is important to clarify that when Tillich speaks of ultimate concern, he means
14

Dell deChant, The Sacred Santa: Religious Dimensions of Consumer Culture (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2002),
9-10.
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ultimate concern in any form; meaning, ultimate concern may attach itself to something
that is not truly ultimate for Tillich’s personal theology (such as sports) but it still
remains ultimate nonetheless.
Building off of these conceptions, my understanding of religion is as follows:
religion imparts a belief in some form of ultimate power (the sacred) that is regularly
conveyed to the community by way of myths and rituals while providing answers to
questions of ultimate concern—whatever that ultimate concern may be. Thus, religion
and the sacred are inherently linked—when one is experiencing the sacred, one is
undoubtedly engaging in the religious. Furthermore, this experience of the sacred (which
is inherently religious) is an essential part of being human. Humanity should be
understood as homo religiosis, meaning where society is, religion is, and always has
been.
On the basis of this understanding of religion and culture, my thesis will argue
that postmodern culture is not best described as secular. By employing Jacques Ellul’s
understanding of the sacred and Vincent Pecora’s “semantic resonance” of religion, this
thesis will provide a more adequate theoretic platform to develop accounts for religion in
postmodernity. Through analysis of various deployments of the secularization thesis in
the context of Ellul’s theory of the proliferating sacred, the adequacy of the available
literature that examines secularization in contemporary society will be evaluated. On the
basis of this evaluation, proposals for reconsideration of the secularization thesis will be
offered.
In order to accomplish the aforementioned task, the thesis will be organized in the
following manner: following this introduction, the first section will review a variety of
7

available interpretations of the secularization thesis to provide a sketch of the current
status of secularization. This section offers critical assessment of these arguments. The
second section positions these interpretations in the context of postmodernity, using
Vincent Pecora’s modification of Jean-Claude Monod’s dialectical understanding of the
secularization process. The third section deploys Jacques Ellul’s idea of the proliferating
sacred to augment Pecora’s aforementioned dialectical understanding of secularization
and thus offers a more stable foundation for the analysis of religion in the postmodern
world. The fourth section presents two examples of such analyses, utilizing both
substantive and functional understandings of religion. In presenting these analyses of
religion, this thesis will demonstrate how the proliferating sacred can be located in
contemporary culture, using either substantive or functional approaches.15 The focus of
this section will be on the proliferation of New Religious Movements and more
traditional forms of religion, as well as the religious function of sports. This will be
followed by a conclusion addressing the implications of this understanding of religion,
secularization, and postmodernity and suggesting how this understanding is already
evident in the work of theorists although not explicitly.

15

It is important to note that in addition to functional and substantive, Catherine Albanese recognizes that
religion can be defined formally too.
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Chapter I- The Limits of the Secularization Process: Macro Not Micro
Through analysis of the understandings of secularization provided by both the
proponents and critics of the secularization thesis a general description of the
secularization process can be provided and the weaknesses and strengths of both sides of
the secularization debate (the proponents and the critics) can be clarified. In presenting
perspectives from both sides of the secularization debate, this chapter will reveal three
features of secularization that are elemental to this thesis. First, it is inaccurate to
understand secularization as a constant process; second, the secularization process should
not be extended to the individual level; and third, strictly relying on the substantive
approach to religion does not adequately account for the role of religion in postmodern
culture. Thus, this chapter will first provide a general account for secularization, and it
will subsequently present arguments from both proponents and critics of the
secularization thesis to establish the weaknesses on both sides of the debate.
The term secularization and the origin of the thesis can be traced to the work of
Max Weber (1864-1920). It was further developed by Ernst Troeltsch in 1958, and
eventually became one of the most prevalent theories in sociology by the early 1970’s.16
While the term originally comes from the Latin sæculum, meaning both “age or era” and
“the world,” it has developed over the centuries to broadly refer to the marginalization of

16

William H. Swatos Jr. and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept” in
William H. Swatos Jr., and Daniel V.A. Olson (ed), The Secularization Debate, (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.: 2000),1-20, at 1-2.
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religious influence on both society and individuals. The critical turning point in this shift
in meaning of the term was after the Protestant Reformation in England when the Crown
began to seize the property of monasteries and churches. This seizing of physical
property from the Church, eventually evolved in the West as the seizing of cultural
property as well. Before presenting the proponents and critics of the secularization
thesis, it is necessary to provide a standard account of secularization.
For organizational purposes, and following William Swatos, secularization is
understood on two levels. The first, less theoretical, level of secularization refers to the
separation of church and state. This level articulates that “people are capable both of
living their lives apart from direct ‘interference’ on the part of religion and that people
may choose among various religions without suffering civil disabilities.”17 However, if
this is all that was meant by secularization, then there would be no debate; in fact, as
William Swatos and Kevin Christiano observe, the theory would have never been
advanced as much as it has because “there would also have been far less excitement
about the topic.”18 When secularization simply refers to the legal separation of church
and state, it is not investigating, it is simply stating facts. What is of interest (especially
to this thesis) and the catalyst for the secularization debate, however, is the second level.
The second level of secularization claims that “in the face of scientific rationality,
religion’s influence on all aspects of life—from personal habits to social institutions—is
in dramatic decline.”19 This is the level that extends secularization from the society to the
individual, and it has been, as Swatos argues, “the principle thrust” of secularization

17

Ibid, 6.
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
18

10

theory.20 An example can be found in The Sacred Canopy by Peter Berger, when he
writes
As there is a secularization of society and culture, so there is a secularization of
consciousness. Put simply, this means that the modern West has produced an
increasing number of individuals who look upon the world and their own lives
without the benefit of religious interpretations.21
The secularization thesis thus views religion as incompatible with the overpowering
features of industrialized culture: scientific research, humanistic education, hightechnology multinational capitalism and bureaucratic organizational life.22 In line with
many theories, secularization views religion as a survival of some earlier evolutionary
stages of humanity, and is no longer useful. The secularization thesis takes a parallel
view of religion to Sigmund Freud’s observation that “Religion would thus be the
universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.”23 It is also important to note that the
secularization thesis tends to primarily focuses on the West, and specifically, institutional
Christianity in the West. Moreover, many secularization theorists are analyzing religion
as a distinct social institution.
Proponents
Now that a standard account of secularization has been provided, the arguments
made by the proponents of secularization can be presented. The first and perhaps most
ubiquitous interpretation of secularization is that of Peter Berger in his classic work The
Sacred Canopy (1967). In this text, Berger defines secularization as “. . .the process by
which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious
20

Ibid.
Peter Berger, 108.
22
William H. Swatos Jr. and Kevin J. Christiano, 7.
23
Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud, (Hogarth Press: 1961), 43.
21

11

institutions and symbols.”24 Berger asserts that since individuals “look upon the world
and their own lives without the benefits of religious interpretation,”25 the secularization
thesis is accurate. He goes on to write “When we speak of society and institutions in
modern Western history, of course, secularization manifests itself in the evacuation by
the Christian Churches of areas previously under their control or influence.”26 This quote
is important to mention, because it is an example of a theorist understanding the lack of
Christian control and influence on society as synonymous with secularization.
Another important point Berger makes is “It [secularization] affects the totality of
cultural life and of ideation, and may be observed in the decline of religious contents in
the arts, in philosophy, in literature and, most important of all, in the rise of science as
autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world.”27 Berger observes
secularization at the individual level in his assertion that “individuals. . .look upon the
world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations.”28
According to Berger, “Religious developments originating in the Biblical tradition
may be seen as causal factors in the formation of the modern secularized world. Once
formed, however, this world precisely precludes the continuing efficacy of religion as a
formative force. We would contend that here lies the great historical irony in the relation
between religion and secularization, an irony that can be graphically put by saying that,
historically speaking, Christianity has been its own gravedigger.”29 The reason this world

24

Peter Berger, 107.
Ibid, 108.
26
Ibid, 107.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid, 108.
29
Ibid, 128-129.
25
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“precisely precludes the continuing efficacy of religion” is due both to the entzauberung
der welt described by Max Weber, and the “institutional specialization of religion.”30
Entzauberung der welt, the disenchantment of the world, refers to the process of
demythologizing the world, which Berger traces back to the Old Testament. Prior to the
Old Testament, “the human world is understood as being embedded in a cosmic order
that embraces the entire universe. . .[this world] posits continuity between the empirical
and the supra-empirical, between the world of men and the world of the gods.”31 Thus,
everything on the human plane is paralleled with the cosmic plane. However, the Old
Testament “posits a God who stands outside the cosmos, which is his creation but which
he confronts and does not permeate.”32 The Old Testament demythologized the universe,
by “creating a distinct polarization between the Transcendent God, and man.”33 This led
to individual identity, because humans no longer saw themselves as representatives of the
mythological cosmos, but as individual humans.
The institutional specialization of religion refers to religion as “an institution
specifically concerned with religion in counterposition with all other institutions of
society.”34 Berger describes this as being relatively rare in the history of religion. The
ramifications of this are explained when Berger writes
The concentration of religious activities and symbols in one institutional
sphere, however, ipso facto defines the rest of society as ‘the world,’ as a
profane realm at least relatively removed from the jurisdiction of the
sacred. The secularizing potential of this could be ‘contained’ as long as
Christendom, with its sensitive balance of the sacred and the profane,
existed as a social reality. With the disintegration of this reality, however,
30

Ibid, 123.
Ibid, 113.
32
Ibid, 115.
33
Ibid, 117.
34
Ibid, 123.
31
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‘the world’ could all the more rapidly be secularized in that it had already
been defined as a realm outside the jurisdiction of the sacred properly speaking.35
The outcome of this process of secularization, according to Berger, is that “the religious
legitimations of the world have lost their plausibility not only for a few intellectuals and
other marginal individuals but for broad masses of entire societies.”36
A theorist in general agreement with Berger is Steve Bruce. In his work Religion
in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (1996), Bruce cites a wide range of
sources, from Max Weber to J. Gordon Melton in asserting that “this book is a robust
defense of the body of ideas commonly designated the ‘secularization thesis.’”37 He
describes the process of secularization when he writes: “The basic elements of what we
conveniently refer to as ‘modernization’ fundamentally altered the place and nature of
religious beliefs, practices, and organizations so as to reduce their relevance to the lives
of nation-states, social groups, and individuals, roughly in that order.”38
Bruce also describes secularization as “the erosion of the supernatural.” 39 He
emphatically asserts that secularization did not occur because people have become better
educated and less credulous. Instead, the following forces were born of modernization:
fragmentation (of society and religion), the eclipse of the community, and rationalization.
These factors have expedited the secularization process and made religion, Bruce writes,
“no longer a matter of necessity; it is a question of preference.”40 Thus, for Bruce,
secularization is evident in religion being voluntary, no longer obligatory.
35

Ibid.
Ibid, 124.
37
Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1996), 6.
38
Ibid, 1.
39
Ibid, 25.
40
Ibid, 46.
36
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What is perhaps most helpful in this text is when Bruce cites and refutes some
criticisms of the secularization thesis. The first criticism is the claim that the
secularization thesis is merely an ideology; that those who offer versions of it are not
actually describing reality but rather trying to justify getting rid of religion. Bruce refutes
this by listing examples of proponents of the secularization thesis that are believers such
as: David Martin, Bryan Wilson, and Peter Berger.
Bruce also cites a criticism of the secularization thesis as saying that it
underestimates the present popularity of religion. He answers this by giving the example
of someone who claims to be a keen football fan, but has not been to a game since
childhood, and does not watch or read about it. Bruce here reminds the reader that the
crux of the secularization thesis is to look at how the medieval religionist practiced, and
how widespread this practice was. Then, to look at the contemporary religionist, how he
or she practices, and how much less widespread that practice is.41 While Bruce may offer
an effective rebuttal of this particular criticism, he, once again, refers to Christianity as
his only example of religion. Bruce argues that church attendance is a valid determinant
of religious belief and conviction—he believes that it reveals the religious, or nonreligious, consciousness of an individual.
Another important proponent of the secularization thesis is Karel Dobbelaere.
Dobbelaere’s article “Toward an Integrated Perspective on the Processes Related to the
Descriptive Concept of Secularization” (2000) was written with the goal to provide “a
more integrated theoretical view of secularization and related processes rather than a

41

Bruce measures how the medieval religionist practiced through examining Christian Court records, and
he measures how the contemporary religionist practices through survey results, predominantly based on
Church attendance.

15

paradigm, and to stimulate international comparative research.”42 In this article
Dobbelaere defines secularization as “a process by which the overarching and
transcendent religious system of old is being reduced in a modern functionally
differentiated society to a subsystem alongside other subsystems, losing in this process its
overarching claims over the other subsystems.”43 This is a particularly good example of
a thinker restricting religion to institutional forms.
When analyzing secularization, Dobbelaere insists that there is a “need to
differentiate between levels of analysis: the macro or societal level, the meso or
subsystem level, and the micro or individual level, suggesting convergences and
divergences between existing theories.”44 This is an important contribution to
secularization theory, because Dobbelaere incorporates precise categories to evaluate the
secularization process.
On the macro level, Dobbelaere asserts that, quoting Bryan Wilson,
“secularization maintains no more than that religion ceases to be significant in the
working of the social system.” 45 Dobbelaere recognizes, along with Berger, that society
has become a smorgasbord of various institutions, and religion is just one of many.
However, prior to the Protestant Reformation, the other institutions were secondary to the
overarching presence of the Catholic Church. Whereas the Catholic Church was the
dominant institution in medieval Europe, in the post-Enlightenment West, the Church is
given equal footing at best.
42

Karel Dobbelaere, “Toward an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive
Concept of Secularization, in William H. Swatos Jr., and Daniel V.A. Olson (ed), The Secularization
Debate, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 2000), 21-39, at 21.
43
Ibid, 24.
44
Ibid, 22.
45
Ibid, 24.
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Dobbelaere portrays the meso level as being quite pluralistic, consisting of
various subsystems, of which religion is just one example. He describes this when he
writes
. . .pluralization has resulted in a religious market, where different religions either
compete for the souls of the people or make agreements not to proselytize, as the
Anglican church has agreed with the Catholic Church in Belgium. Religious
pluralism and competition augments the relativity of their respective religious
messages, or in Berger’s terms ‘it relativizes their religious contents’ their
religious message is ‘de-objectivated,’ and more generally, ‘the pluralistic
situation . . .ipso facto plunges into a crisis of credibility.’46
Thus, the meso level of society can be viewed as a bazaar, where religion is offered
alongside many other products, giving individuals a variety of options. With such
competition, this “crisis of credibility” transforms religion into a commodity, forcing the
institution of religion to establish its plausibility to individuals.
Dobbelaere defines the exemplars of the individual or micro level as
“individualization, unbelief, bricolage, and decline in church religiosity, i.e., the
unchurching of individuals and the lower church involvement of members.”47 When
religion is just one of many available institutions in society, individuals are given the
luxury of choice; thus many are apt to choose an institution other than religion. This
pluralistic setting, according to Dobbelaere, is the precise breeding ground for the
secularization process. Therefore, Dobbelaere avers “Secularization indicates that since
religious institutions have lost authority and relevance in society and its subsystems, then,
as a consequence of the declining impact of the buttressing organizations, the religious
collective consciousness, in the Durkheimian sense, must be changing.”48
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Critics
William Swatos and Kevin Christiano, in “Secularization Theory: The Course of a
Concept”, remark that “The underlying conflict to be resolved with respect to
‘secularization’ is whether the term can be used in a relatively value-neutral analytic way
or whether it inherently carries unsubstantiated value presuppositions.”49 Meaning, is
there any way to settle the debate between scholars, when the term is seemingly a value
judgment in and of itself? Swatos and Christiano assert that secularization is “based on
almost no historical evidence. Rather than systematic studies of the past, it draws from
the commonsense generalizations about history related to systematic studies of the
present.”50
Swatos and Christiano cite the underlying religious myth of the secularization
thesis as affirming “in the past, people were significantly more religious than they are
today. That is, that sometime, some place in the past there was a solidary Age of Faith in
which ‘the world was filled with the sacred.’”51 However, Swatos and Christiano cite
monasticism in the Medieval period as contrary evidence to the supposed Age of Faith.
“. . . monastic life is understood to be other-worldly asceticism, that is withdrawal from
the world. If the Medieval world was so full of the sacred, why did people want to
withdraw from it in such numbers?”52
Another problem with secularization is pluralism. Swatos and Christiano claim
that “In many respects, secularization theory was an attempt to account for how pluralism
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was reshaping the religious map.”53 Proponents of secularization, such as Berger, Bruce,
and Dobbelaere, cite the pluralistic nature of Western society as primary support for
secularization. However, Swatos and Christiano argue that just because people “want
their religion á la carte does not necessarily mean that they are ‘less religious.’”54 One is
then led to ask, has there never been pluralism in the past? Swatos and Christiano point
to the Confessions of St. Augustine as an example of pluralism in the 5th century CE.
Augustine tried out several belief systems (including Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism)
before settling on Christianity. However, had Augustine chosen a religion other than
Christianity, would he have been any less religious? Of course not! Swatos and
Christiano emphasize that it is sociologically important to understand that “if people
cease to believe that Jesus Christ is God and instead believe that Saytha Sai Baba is God,
no secularization has occurred.”55 Others, such as Mark Chaves and Phillip Gorski, have
argued that there actually is no empirical link between pluralism and secularization.
Chaves and Gorski demonstrate, in fact, most social science research that has explored
the connection between pluralism and religious participation has been inconclusive.56
Perhaps a bit more pointedly and certainly more sardonically, the next theorist
considered here, Rodney Stark remarks:
Of course, doctrines change—Aquinas was not Augustine, and both would find
heresy in the work of Avery Dulles. But change does not equate with decline! If
next year everyone in Canada became a pious Hindu this could have many
interpretations, but secularization would not be among them. Indeed, what is
needed is a body of theory to explain religious variation, to tell us when and why
53
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various aspects of religiousness rise and fall, or are stable. In that regard, the
secularization theory is as useless as a hotel elevator that only goes down.57
Since the 1980’s, Rodney Stark has been one of the staunchest critics of the
secularization thesis. Citing thinkers such as Thomas Woolston, Sigmund Freud,
Friedrich Engels, and A.E. Crawley, whose predictions of the end of religion serve as the
earliest forms of the secularization thesis, Stark notes that “From the beginning, social
scientists have celebrated the secularization thesis despite the fact that it never was
consistent with empirical reality.”58 In “Secularization, R.I.P.,” he notes five
characteristics common to secularization theory.
The first characteristic is that “modernization is the causal engine dragging the
gods into retirement. That is, the secularization doctrine has always nestled within the
broader theoretical framework of modernization theories, it being proposed that as
industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization increase, religiousness must
decrease.”59
The second characteristic is that “they are not directed primarily toward
institutional differentiation—they do not merely predict the separation of church and state
or a decline in the direct, secular authority of church leaders. Their primary concern is
with individual piety, especially belief.”60 However, Stark does not find a decline in
individual religious belief, and he feels that this has caused secularization to be defined in
several ways, permitting some proponents of the thesis to “shift definitions as needed in
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order to escape inconvenient facts.”61 While secularization theorists will often claim that
they are only speaking of secularization on the institutional level, Stark argues that
secularization on the individual level has been the driving force behind the theories.
At issue is not a narrow prediction concerning a rowing separation of church and
state. Instead, as we have seen, from the start the prophets of secularization have
stressed personal piety, and to the extent that they expressed macro interests it has
been to claim that they are so linked that a decline in one necessitates a decline in
the other. Thus, if the churches lose power, personal piety will fade; if personal
piety fades, the churches will lose power.62
Here, Stark questions the positive correlation between secularization on the
societal/macro level and individual/micro level. Stark actually argues that pluralism (or
macro level secularization) results in religious revival on the individual level.63
The third characteristic of secularization theory is that “implicit in all versions and
explicit in most, is the claim that of all aspects of modernization, it is science that has the
most deadly implications for religion.”64
The fourth characteristic is that secularization is “regarded as an absorbing state—
that once achieved it is irreversible, instilling mystical immunity.”65
The fifth and final characteristic of secularization is that while theories focus on
Christendom, all leading proponents apply it globally. Meaning, as Stark so poignantly
remarks, “Allah is fated to join Jehovah as only ‘an interesting historical memory.’
However, no one has bothered to explain this to Muslims.”66
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It is now appropriate to return to Peter Berger, the present-day Peter Berger that
is. In recent years he has had a change of mind, and refuted his argument in The Sacred
Canopy that was presented earlier in this thesis. In The Desecularization of the World
(1999), Berger writes “The world today, with some exceptions to which I will come
presently, is as furiously religious as ever. This means that a whole body of literature by
historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization’ theory is essentially
mistaken. . .That idea [secularization] is simple. Modernization necessarily leads to a
decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals. And it is precisely
this key idea that has turned out to be wrong.”67 This change of mind is important to
note. In his classic work, The Sacred Canopy, Berger was analyzing the modern world,
however, in his more recent work he is, as this thesis is doing, he is analyzing the
postmodern world. Along with this book, Berger wrote a paper and presented it at a
conference at Georgetown Univeristy in the summer of 2005, and in this paper he wrote
“It is not so much the what as the how of religious belief that changes.”68 This notion is
important to understand. Just because the influence of a certain religion has declined, it
does not mean that religion in general has declined.
Before moving to Part II a brief recap can be offered. In short, secularization can
be understood as the marginalization of religious influence in society and individual
consciousness. As revealed here, with evidence of religious resurgence in the West (as
well as other parts of the world) secularization should not be understood as a constant
process (as the proponents understand it). However, just because the process does not
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appear to be linear, with religious participation in a constant state of decline, the
secularization thesis should not be abandoned as Stark et al (the critics) have argued.
Also revealed here is the extension of secularization to the individual/micro level is
highly contested, therefore there is little or no proof that individual religious participation
has declined significantly. However, as will be revealed shortly, strictly relying on the
substantive approach to religion (as most of the critics and proponents of secularization)
does not adequately account for the role of religion in postmodern culture. While these
three features of secularization may lead one to call for an end to the secularization thesis,
I propose that there is a middle ground in this secularization debate which preserves the
necessary and helpful features of the secularization thesis while allowing for the
modification of weaker elements. Part II will present a work from this middle ground—
Vincent Pecora’s Secularization and Cultural Criticism: Religion, Nation, & Modernity
(2006).
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Chapter II- Secularization: A Dialectical Understanding
By providing a middle ground in the secularization debate, the theoretic platform
that this thesis proposes to account for religion in postmodernity can begin to be
constructed. In this chapter, Vincent Pecora’s understanding of the secularization process
as dialectical and his notion of the “semantic resonance” of religion will be presented as
foundational elements in the platform this thesis seeks to construct. Pecora recognizes
that secularization is a process that constantly doubles back on itself, thus religion is not
in a constant state of decline; but instead, it is preserved by the very process
(secularization) that supposedly limits it. In fact, the semantic resonance of religion
continues to be present in what is typically understood as a secular culture.
Semantic Resonance
Vincent Pecora’s Secularization and Cultural Criticism: Religion, Nation, and
Modernity (2006) supplies the necessary middle ground for analyzing secularization in
the postmodern setting. This text offers what is, perhaps, the best available review of
philosophical literature, without ignoring the sociological literature, on secularization,
and provides a novel understanding of the theory. After Pecora briefly reviews various
understandings of secularization, he writes “It may come as no surprise that the empirical
study of religion and secularization in the West is itself a mass of contradictions and
opposed perspectives.”69 In bringing these contradictions to light, he offers a description,
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derived from Jean-Claude Monod, which appears to be the best available understanding
of secularization.
In effect. . .if secularization signifies the retreat of religion as a dominant sphere
and the reconstruction of institutions on a rational basis, it accords well with two
fundamental assumptions about modernity, which Monod adapts from Reinhart
Koselleck: ‘the belief that the present epoch opens a new perspective without
precedent, and the belief according to which men are capable, and more and more
capable, of ‘making’ history.’ In this sense, secularization becomes one of the
‘guiding-concepts’ of modern times.
This understanding of secularization is consistent the position of the proponents of
secularization. It is essentially describing secularization, to use Dobbelaere’s typology,
on the macro level. Both proponents and critics of secularization seem to view
secularization in this same light. However, it is the second part of Pecora’s
understanding of secularization, that offers departure from the standard accounts, which
is of importance to this thesis. Pecora continues his description of secularization when he
writes:

On the other hand, ‘if secularization designates essentially a transfer having
consisted of schemes and models elaborated in the field of religion; if religion
thus continues to nourish modernity without its knowledge, the theory of
secularization constitutes a putting into question of the two fundamental modern
beliefs. Modernity would live only as something consisting of a bequest and
inheritance, despite the negations and illusions of auto-foundation. Modernity
would then not be a new time, founded and conscious of its foundations, but
would be only the moment where there is effected a change of plan, a ‘worlding’
of Christianity.’”70
This “worlding of Christianity” that Pecora presents here is imperative to understanding
his view of secularization. Pecora explains that through the process of secularization “the
religious is both negated and variously rediscovered in the idea of the social . . . [and] the
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process of secularization in the West paradoxically may have enabled the making sacred
of ‘society.’”71
This offers a different understanding of secularization than the other
secularization theorists. It is in this remark where Pecora makes the observation that
religion is still resonant in contemporary times, and that, in fact, it has always been. He
borrows Jürgen Habermas’ concept of semantic contents and refers to this as “semantic
resonance.”72 In explaining this notion, Habermas writes “As long as religious language
bears with itself, indeed, unrelinquishable semantic contents [resonance] which elude (for
the moment?) the expressive power of a philosophical language and still await translation
into a discourse that gives reasons for its positions, philosophy, even in its
postmetaphysical form, will neither be able to replace nor repress religion.”73 Thus, just
as the implentation of quotas was meant to counter racism but still contains within in it
categories inherently racist, secularization limits and marginalizes religion, but actually
preserves it (in the form of semantic resonance) in the process. This semantic resonance
of religion is traced by Pecora throughout the post-Enlightenment intellectual history of
the West. He does this by reviewing thinkers including, but not limited to the following:
Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, Alasdair MacIntyre,
Matthew Arnold, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Siegried Kracauer, and Emile
Durkheim to demonstrate that, even with the vast differences in theories, all of these
theorists have a religious resonance in their work, despite their commitment to secular
ideals.
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For Pecora, the most striking example of this semantic resonance of religion is
found in Virginia Woolf, a British novelist who is considered by many one of the
foremost modernist literary figures of the twentieth century, and the Bloomsbury Group.
Virginia Woolf’s great-grandfather and grandfather were members of an Anglican group
of social reformers known as the Clapham Sect. However, Virginia Woolf and a few of
her siblings were members of the controversial Bloomsbury Group—a group of atheists
with antagonist attitudes toward religion. Pecora traces this road from the Clapham Sect
to the Bloomsbury Group in an attempt to illustrate that even the most secular parts of
culture (the Bloomsbury Group) maintain a semantic resonance of religion. Pecora
understands the Bloomsbury Group to be the epitome of the dialectical process of
secularization. While the group appears to be the quintessential example of secularity, it
cannot escape from the Puritanical cultural milieu it emerged out of. In fact, John
Maynard Keynes, a member of the Bloomsbury Group, described the group in a memoir
as closely following “the English puritan tradition.”74 Therefore, Woolf’s “secular”
viewpoints and lifestyle were “powerfully intertwined with the cultural narrative of her
(largely disavowed) religious tradition.”75 Meaning, even what is initially understood as
being profoundly secular contains a resonance of religion—a resonance that never is
removed. For the Bloomsbury Group this resonance was the worldview of social reform
and criticism of the ruling class that was similar to the Christian Clapham Sect.
It is important to note that this is an example of Pecora’s elitist tendencies. By
only locating this semantic resonance of religion in the scholarly community, and the
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Bloomsbury Group, he never seems to make clear the empirical connection between the
resonance of religion among the elite, and the presence of this semantic resonance of
religion among the masses. Along with this, Pecora does not propose a way to measure
the semantic resonance of religion, apart from textual analysis (which is indicative of his
postmodernist tendencies). With this method of textual analysis, he does not offer
justification for his selection process, in terms of why he chose these particular theorists,
as opposed to presenting others.
Important to Pecora’s understanding of secularization, is his recognition that the
persistence of religion is consistent with the secularization process; but in a way that
seems entirely different from many of the proponents of secularization. Rather than
giving attention to demographic data and related disputes or focusing on traditional or
institutional embodiments of religion, which is typical of studies of secularization,76
Pecora recognizes enduring substrata of religious ideas not easily recognized in
institutional forms of religion or not easily quantifiable via demography. For him, the
key is an enduring cultural consciousness of religion, which functions somewhat like a
sub-world or secondary cultural base.77 He refers to this enduring consciousness of
religion, or sub-world, when he writes:
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The will to secular rationality in modern culture thus preserves the imaginative
rudiments of its religious traditions, not merely as a kind of strategic resistance to
the irrationality of capitalism’s ‘iron cage’ and its demand that everything have a
price, that all things be treated equivalently as no more than commodities, but
because secularism, in constantly redefining and reenergizing itself by reference
to outworn religious traditions, is finally a way of preserving, at a more rarified
and rationally persuasive level of awareness, precisely what it seeks to destroy.78
This understanding is generally at odds with the bulk of secularization literature that
limits the interpretation of religion to Christianity and institutional forms of religion and
seems preoccupied with issues related to demographic data. This is important, because it
sets Pecora apart from the aforementioned critics and proponents of secularization.
For example, when critics, such as Stark, find religion persisting, they
immediately see it as counting against the secularization thesis. However, Pecora finds
the semantic resonance of religion to be completely compatible with the secularization
process. Conversely, proponents of the secularization fail to recognize the semantic
resonance of religion in the postmodern setting. Apparently this is because the existence
of religion in any form, including semantic resonance, would count against
secularization.79
Thus, Pecora’s position on semantic resonance stands in distinction from both
dominant positions on secularization. Perhaps the key reason for Pecora’s uniqueness in
this regard is that he has added one additional measure that can be used to examine
whether secularization is truly occurring, and that measure is semantic resonance. While
some scholars examine secularization by analyzing institutional differentiation, others
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through trends in acceptance of religious authority, and others by analyzing the
privatization of religion, Pecora is asserting that it is equally important to examine the
semantic resonance of religion. Examining this semantic resonance can allow scholars to
analyze the “imaginative rudiments” of religious traditions.
Absent Pecora’s nuanced approach, any evidence of persistent religion causes
critics to call for a rejection of the secularization thesis, and proponents to question the
authenticity of survey results. However, when the study of religion is shifted from
strictly quantitative grounds, which seems to dominate secularization literature, and
moved to a broader cultural analysis, the presence of religion becomes more
recognizable. To use a hackneyed expression, but one which in this case is remarkably
apt, this is a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. While secularization theorists
continually devote their focus to survey results regarding Church attendance and
participation, they completely miss the profound manifestation of religion all around
them.
Verwindung
To further explain the seemingly contradictory nature of the secularization
process, Pecora borrows a concept from Martin Heidegger and suggests that
secularization should be understood as Verwindung, a distortion. He describes this
Verwindung as“. . . an extended, errant process of recollection, transformation,
convalescence and emancipation, a process that is constantly doubling back upon
itself.”80 Thus, because of the constant doubling back on itself, religion is both
marginalized and reinforced at the same time and the relationship between religion and
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secularization should be understood as dialectical, not oppositional. This, again, sets
Pecora apart from both proponents and critics of secularization. Proponents, such as
Bruce, argue that religion is in a constant state of decline, while Pecora notes that due to
the dialectical process of secularization, religion is actually necessary and indispensable
to the process of secularization. On the other hand, critics, such as Rodney Stark, argue
that the process of secularization is cyclical, and human history has been marked by
cycles of religious decline and revival.81
To better explicate the distorting character of the secularization process, Pecora
writes,
. . . secularization can be considered simultaneously curative and distorting in the
sense that its consequences can be understood to include both an enlightened
liberation from dogma and an opening up of certain collective possibilities—
redemptive revolution, nationalism, imperialism, racism—that could not have
attained their full and often destructive potential otherwise.82
This interpretation of secularization seems to be an adequate cultural critique, and, with
certain modifications, as will be offered in the following chapter, it may well serve to
even more accurately portray contemporary American society.
As has been presented in this chapter, Pecora recognizes that secularization is a
process that constantly doubles back on itself, thus religion is not in a constant state of
decline; but instead, it is preserved by the very process (secularization) that supposedly
limits it. In fact, the semantic resonance of religion continues to be present in what is
typically understood as a secular culture. However, this semantic resonance of religion
seems to be located only in the elite of society. Therefore, to adequately account for
religion throughout culture, Pecora needs to be modified.
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As a basis for this proposed modification of Pecora, it is important to note his
specific understanding of religion as well. In the introduction of his text he writes “. . . it
is clear that a more functional definition of religion, of the kind pioneered by Emile
Durkheim, which focuses on the social cohesion religion provides rather than on the
depth or efficacy of specific beliefs, may allow for a broader and richer understanding of
the persistence of religious motifs in nominally secular social life.”83 It is precisely this
type of understanding that Jacques Ellul provides in his work.
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Chapter III- The Proliferating Sacred
Jacques Ellul’s observation that “the sacred is proliferating around us”84 can be
used to supplement Pecora’s idea of the “semantic resonance” of religion. Where Pecora
finds the persistence of religion in the elite, Ellul observes the sacred throughout society.
Although Ellul draws distinctions between the sacred and religion (as will be presented in
the next chapter), as presented at the beginning of this analysis, I view the sacred and
religion as inherently linked—where one is, so the other is as well. Therefore, this
chapter explores Ellul’s notion of the proliferating sacred to further construct a theoretic
platform, which began by accounting for religion as mere “semantic resonance” but will
end by locating religion “all around us.”
Perhaps one of the most prolific writers in the twentieth century was the French
sociologist and theologian Jacques Ellul. His work is especially helpful in the study of
secularization. Of his many works, perhaps one of the most intriguing is The New
Demons (1975). In this work Jacques Ellul offers an understanding of religion which
appears to be quite similar to Pecora’s. Ellul writes that
Without the slightest intention of falling back on the idea that religion is inherent
in man’s nature, without basing anything at all on a nature of man, we can at least
note that religion has always fulfilled an essential function, and we can raise the
question whether, in that case, it is not inexhaustibly renewed. Religion is not an
‘ideology’ in the Marxist sense, nor is it a gratuitous and superficial activity.
Since it is a collective expression and manifestation, it is obviously sociological,
but to see it merely as a ‘historical stage of humanity’ or as a ‘reflection-cloakjustification’ of man’s actual condition is childish. Religion has the most
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profound and seemingly ineradicable roots in the very being of man. Experience
shows it to be ineradicable, because the greatest attempts to destroy religion only
result in new religiousness.85

This relates to Pecora’s understanding secularization as verwindung—the process is
constantly doubling back on itself. Pecora’s observation that religion is simultaneously
being marginalized and reinforced seems to demonstrate the ineradicable roots of
religion. In this way, Pecora seems to be echoing Stark’s observation that the
secularization process’ effect on religion is like “driving in a nail—the harder you hit, the
deeper it goes.”86 The secularization process can certainly be considered one of these
“greatest attempts” to destroy religion, however, when understood dialectically as Pecora
argues, religion necessarily persists. However, as will be presented momentarily, Pecora
fails to address this “new religiousness.”
Ellul goes on in his understanding of religion by offering some comments on the
secularization process in the West87. He writes,
The nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century witness an
overwhelming advance of rationalism, scientism, and secularization. But all that
came into play only in connection with Christianity. . .Then, the moment the
defeat of Christianity became obvious, when, also, enough time had elapsed to
allow the religious to free itself, to invest in new objects and develop new forms,
religion reappeared. . .Hence there was a temporary hiatus, but basically such
interruptions are observed whenever a religious system goes down and another
takes its place. The succession is never immediate. The replacement is not
automatic, and those who live during that period always lament the irreligion of
their times and the loss of sacred traditions.88
This understanding seems to be in agreement with Pecora’s notion of “semantic
resonance” and the dialectical relationship between religion and secularization.
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However, further analysis of Ellul demonstrates quite a different view of contemporary
society than that of Pecora. While Pecora sees “semantic resonance” of religion in the
secular ideas of various scholars, Ellul finds the seemingly secular ideas and institutions
to actually be full blown expressions of religion. This is evident when Ellul writes, “. . .
our world is so religious that objects and actions of the most materialistic kind, those
seemingly most devoid of depth, are transformed into religious phenomena.”89
On Secularization
Ellul advances the claim that the fundamental heresy, and the cause of what many
scholars term secularization, was the relationship between church and state in
Christendom which led the church to “conformism and power.”90 This was the root
cause of, what Ellul terms, the post-Christian era. In his evaluation, it was because of the
overbearing power of the Church, society became laicized; meaning religion played no
dominant role in the state. The two spheres of Church and State that seemingly parallel
the cities St. Augustine wrote about in The City of God became separate, setting the
foundation for contemporary society.
The separation of these two spheres and Christianity’s loss of influence over
everyday life is consistent with other understandings of the secularization process.
However, Ellul asserts that the “improper assimilation of religion and Christianity”91 is
the catalyst for the secularization thesis. By this he means there would not even be a
secularization thesis if these terms, Christianity and religion, had not been conflated. As
he writes,
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The intellectual progression which has led from post-Christendom to the idea of a
secularized society (or to the secular city) reflects a defect of method and not only
a philosophic urge. In particular, there is a complete lack of critique with regard
to presuppositions and preconceptions, hence a complete breakdown with regard
to the concepts employed.92
It is important to contrast Ellul’s line of analysis here with Bruce’s refutation of
the ideological nature of secularization. As presented previously, Bruce asserts that
secularization cannot be considered an ideology, because there are Christians who are
proponents of the secularization thesis themselves. Bruce’s argument here appears to be
a fallacious argument ad hominem. Bruce uses the personal beliefs of a theorist to
determine the validity of a theory. Ellul, on the other hand does not attach any value to
the personal beliefs an individual. He argues that
[this] view of modern man and modern society [the view advanced by the
secularization thesis] leads to the conclusion that the sacred, myth, the religious,
theism, are categories corresponding to the past, outworn, and obsolete attitudes
which can only be nonproductive. . .Thus, a priori, those concepts and categories
are exhausted. They cannot appear in new forms. This is very interesting, for it
shows . . . in their very claim to be putting an end to dogmatism, [they] continue
to be dogmatic.93
This is a modification of Bruce asserting that the secularization thesis is not ideological.
Ellul argues that the secularization thesis is dogmatic at the very least, and that
secularization theorists “philosophic urge” regardless of the personal beliefs of the
scholar. It is evident that Ellul is addressing Christian scholars here too, because he
singles out Harvey Cox as a particularly fine example of this dogmatism.
By seemingly using the terms religion and Christianity interchangeably, Ellul
argues that theorists who advance the secularization thesis falsely claim that
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contemporary culture has rejected the sacred. Ellul counters this by asserting that
contemporary culture is suffused with the sacred, not just the Christian sacred.
In reality, one passes from the statement that ‘modern man no longer believes in
Jesus Christ’ to ‘modern man is atheistic,’ from ‘modern man is no longer
Christian’ to ‘modern man is no longer religious,’ from ‘modern man no longer
reads the Bible and no longer listens to sermons’ to ‘modern man is rational and
takes no part in mythical discourse. . .I stress the fact that this necessarily
presupposes the prior assimilation of Christianity with religion, the mystery of
revelation with the sacred, and the recitation of the Bible with myth.94
This also sets Ellul apart from the critics of secularization as well. In challenging
the secularization thesis, Ellul does not cite church attendance or other data as counter
evidence, or challenge the existence of a golden age of faith (such as the medieval
period), as do Stark and Swatos, Ellul focuses on the problem of terminology; the error of
fallaciously conflating the terms religion and Christianity. By arguing semantics, Ellul
actually seems to grant the proponents of secularization a general decline in church
attendance (primarily in some parts of Europe); however, he argues that there are other
forms of the sacred besides the Christian sacred. This is similar to the arguments of
Swatos, Christiano, and Stark, because Ellul is willing to get away from the confines of
institutional religion and Christianity.
It is also important to note that this sets Ellul apart from Pecora as well. Pecora
understands secularization as a dialectical process, which both preserves and
marginalizes religion simultaneously; however, he still can be considered a proponent of
secularization. Ellul, on the other hand, clearly rejects arguments in support of
secularization due to their being predicated on faulty understandings of both religion and
the sacred.
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Functions and Forms of the Sacred
Ellul begins his description of the sacred by writing, “The sacred has to relate to
man’s necessary condition, to that which is inevitably imposed upon him, to that which
he must experience without any possibility of remission.”95 He organizes his description
of the sacred into the following three categories: functions of the sacred (of which there
are three), forms of the sacred (of which there are three), and the sacred today. For
organizational purposes, this thesis will use these same categories to explicate Ellul’s
theory.
In the first category of analysis, Ellul explains that the sacred has three basic
functions. The first function of the sacred is the function of discrimination. Ellul
explains that in the process of establishing an order, the sacred has a function of
discrimination. It is a “bestower of meaning”96 and orientation by placing boundaries and
limitations. The sacred reveals what actions are allowed and what actions are forbidden,
and even where these actions are permitted (sacred space). In establishing certain
actions, or rites, in the context of sacred space, individuals receive meaning from the
sacred.
The second function is that it deals with time. Ellul expounds upon this by
writing, “Sacred time is inserted into the sacred order as a period of legitimate disorder,
of transgression included in order.”97 Ellul’s description of the sacred and its relationship
to time is seemingly in line with the work of Mircea Eliade. Eliade recognized that in
cosmological cultures, there were often times of ritual chaos, but what made the chaos
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ritualistic and sacred was that the chaos was overcome.98 Sacred time is often chaotic or a
period of “legitimate disorder . . . which one must come out of if the [sacred] order is to
have force, virtue, and validity.”99
The third and perhaps most crucial function of the sacred is that it integrates the
individual into the group. The sacred provides harmony between the individual and the
group through justifying and normalizing behaviors and beliefs. Without the sacred,
according to Ellul, there is no group, and humans cannot exist without the group.100
In the second category of analysis, Ellul asserts that the sacred contains three
different forms. The first form is an expression of the unpredictable, dark and destructive
powers. Ellul writes that “It [the sacred] is the concentration of all that threatens and
saves man.”101 The second form is a combination of absolute value (which defines the
boundary of the sacred), rites of commitment (rites of initiation, one has to learn and be
trained, the absolute value becomes the personal value), or embodiment in a person (a
person becomes a reference for people as an example of the sacred- how they should act,
appear, behave, etc). Ellul explains the third form of the sacred by writing that it “. . .is
organized around opposite poles which, though conflicting, are equally sacred. . .The
sacred is the coupling of pure/impure, holy/blemished, cohesion/dissolution,
sacred/profane, respect/violation, life/death.”102 For Ellul, the sacred is the relation
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between the two opposites. It is around the axes where the order of the world is
established.
The third category, and most important for this thesis, is Ellul’s description is the
sacred today. It is here where Ellul makes his critical observations of the status of the
sacred in contemporary society. Ellul writes that “. . .it cannot be said that man is no
longer religious just because Christianity is no longer the religion of the masses. To the
contrary, he is just as religious as medieval man. It cannot be said that there is nothing
sacred now just because we claim to have emptied out the sacred from nature, sex, and
death. To the contrary, the sacred is proliferating all around us.”103
This idea of the proliferating sacred, while in partial agreement with Pecora’s
notion of “semantic resonances” of religion in the secular, is a different read of the nature
of the sacred, and hence the nature of religion as well, in postmodern society. Rather
than labeling society as being essentially secular with a deep subterranean of religious
impulses and drives as Pecora does, Ellul, as mentioned previously, claims society is
fundamentally religious.104 Thus, applying Ellul’s notion of the proliferating sacred to
Pecora’s revised understanding of secularization, one can gather that contemporary
society is not best understood as being fundamentally secular, but, rather, it is better
understood as profoundly religious.105
However, the religious character of contemporary society should not be
understood as being religious in the transcendental sense. Using Dell deChant’s
description (based on Eric Voeglin’s), transcendental refers to “religions and culture
103

Ibid, 65.
See footnote #87.
105
This is in line with the conclusions of Rodney Stark, James Beckford, Lorne Dawson, Andrew Greeley,
and numerous other sociologists of religion.
104

40

systems that locate the ground of being in a supernatural dimension—literally, a realm
beyond and radically different from nature.”106 Rather than understanding contemporary
society in this transcendental sense, it is perhaps more helpful to understood
contemporary society as being religious in a cosmological sense, similar to primal and
archaic cultures.107 Again, following deChant (and Voeglin), cosmological refers to
“religions and cultural systems that locate the ground of being or ultimate concern in the
natural world.”108 Ellul describes the different nature of contemporary religion when he
writes,
After an appearance of rationality, coupled with an obvious indifference to
Christianity and heightened by the rationalism of the nineteenth century, we have
witnessed for a half century now a prodigious resurgence of religions. But they
are no longer the same . . . The situation is the same as at the beginning. The
need is the same one our distant ancestors knew. It is the same specifically
religious attitude, lending similar, though not identical, explanations.109
This religious need that “our ancestors knew,” as well as the resurgence of
religions that “are no longer the same” as Christianity, can be explained by asserting that
contemporary religion is best understood as embodying a cosmological sense of the
sacred and a religious expression that is antithetical to transcendental religions, including
the dominant religion of the West—Christianity. Further, if this reading is correct, Ellul
is challenging the secularization thesis in a particularly novel manner. It is not so much
that the secularization thesis is rejected, but rather that it is corrected in two major ways.
First, Ellul is correcting an error in terminology found in many early works on
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secularization, in which the terms Christianity and religion become conflated. Secondly,
Ellul shifts the focus of the thesis from transcendental religion to cosmological
expressions. Finally, the virtue of reading Pecora through the lens of Ellul is that the
manifestation of Pecora’s “resonance” becomes explicit not implicit, dynamic not
passive, and proliferous not residual. The implications of this to the secularization thesis
are particularly significant and they will be considered in the conclusion. Prior to
considering these implications, however, a brief observation of how the proliferating
sacred may be experienced in contemporary society will be offered.
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Chapter IV- Locating the Proliferating Sacred in Contemporary Society
In order to better reveal the significance of Ellul’s approach to the analysis of
religion in contemporary culture, this section will attempt to locate examples of the
proliferating sacred. To accomplish this, this section will first specifically address the
relationship between the sacred and religion. Subsequently, examples of the proliferating
sacred will be presented using first a substantive definition of religion, followed by a
functional understanding of religion. This thesis will locate the proliferating sacred using
a substantive approach by examining participation in traditional institutional religion and
the proliferation of New Religious Movements. To locate a contemporary manifestation
of the proliferating sacred using a functional understanding of religion, this thesis will
review Joseph Price’s work analyzing sports and religion. It will become evident that
Price is one example of a scholar studying seemingly secular phenomena (sports) using
religious categories. However, Price offers this analysis completely oblivious to Ellul’s
theory. Nonetheless, this analysis seems to be entirely consistent with Ellul’s work.
Following this brief review, specific analysis of sports embodying Ellul’s understanding
of the sacred will be offered.
The Sacred and Religion
It is important to now delineate where certain details of Ellul’s theory, will not be
deployed. The approach to studying religion in postmodernity that this thesis is
proposing is not as nuanced as Ellul’s theory, therefore it does not fully deploy Ellul’s
43

understanding of the relationship between the sacred and religion. While this thesis
certainly defers full treatment of Ellul’s theory on the sacred and religion, it is necessary
to briefly present Ellul’s understanding, and then demonstrate that in terms of this
analysis, the omission of Ellul’s detailed distinctions between the sacred and the holy
does no disservice to his theory.
According to Ellul, the sacred is not a category of religion; rather, religion is one
possible “rendition of the sacred.”110 Therefore, for Ellul, sports or politics do not have
to be considered religion; they can just be considered expressions of the sacred.
Furthermore, religious phenomena themselves can be divided into either the sacred or the
holy. Both the sacred and the holy are “religious” but they are quite the opposite. The
sacred sacralizes the social world, while the holy desacralizes the social world. Ellul
makes the distinction between the sacred and the holy to explain how, as Max Weber
indicated, religion can either reinforce the routine order of society (this is what the sacred
does) or it can charismatically transform the social order (this is what the holy does).111
The practical example of this is that Christianity was used to reinforce the order of
society that advocated segregation and slavery; however, Christianity was also used by
Martin Luther King Jr. to transform this social order through the civil rights movement.
How can the same cause (religion) lead to two opposite effects (segregation/slavery and
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civil rights)? Ellul answers this question by establishing two categories for religion to
draw from—the sacred and the holy.112
Since religion can be a rendition of either the sacred or the holy, if one classifies a
certain phenomenon as sacred, following Jacques Ellul, it does not necessarily mean that
the particular phenomenon should be considered religious—because religion is just one
avenue of experiencing the sacred. However, if one classifies a phenomenon as religious,
then it can be considered a manifestation of the sacred,113 because religion is a rendition
of the sacred according to Ellul. This thesis does not offer Ellul’s nuanced distinction
between the sacred and the holy, because that particular distinction seems to be an ethical
distinction, and this thesis is not conducting an ethical analysis of culture. As Darrell
Fasching has demonstrated in his work,114 Ellul’s categories of the sacred and the holy
are quite helpful when doing comparative religious ethics; however these distinctions are
not as helpful when evaluating the secularization thesis. Therefore, this thesis does not
deploy the sacred/holy dichotomy that Ellul offers because the distinction both
convolutes and unnecessarily complicates this particular argument by adding tangential
ethical categories. With this being established, when this thesis is attempting to locate a
“rendition of the sacred” it is, in fact, actually attempting to locate “religion.”
Furthermore, this thesis argues that Ellul’s idea that contemporary society is “profoundly
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religious” is best supported by identifying instances of the presence of the proliferating
sacred he describes.
Substantive and Functional Approaches to Religion
When defining religion, scholars typically use one of two approaches—the
substantive approach or the functional approach.115 As Steve Bruce explains, “Functional
definitions identify religion in terms of what it does: for example, providing solutions to
‘ultimate problems’, or answering fundamental questions of the human condition.
Substantive definitions identify religion in terms of what it is: for example, beliefs and
actions which assume the existence of supernatural beings or powers.”116 Naturally, each
way of defining religion has both advantages and drawbacks.
Substantive definitions of religion focus on the inner core and essence of religion,
and tend to emphasize a relationship between the practitioner and an ultimate power.117
These definitions are helpful because they set limits for what can be considered religion,
and what cannot be. This draws a distinct line between what is religion/sacred and what
is secular/profane. However, in setting these limits, substantive definitions tend to be
over-exclusive. This tendency towards over-exclusivity is most likely the result of the
use of “supernatural” in the majority of substantive definitions. Substantive definitions
work well with Western religions, but they are difficult to apply to Eastern religions, such
as Confucianism or Daoism.
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The functional approach to religion is different than the substantive approach,
because the functional approach does not focus on what religion is. Rather, the
functional approach seeks to answers the following questions: Why do people hold these
beliefs? Why do religions survive? As Daniel Pals points out, “the answer [to these
questions] can be found only in one place: not in the content of the beliefs, not in what
they claim about gods or the world, but in their function—in what they do, socially, for
those who live by them.”118 Therefore functional definitions of religion are easier to
apply cross-culturally, to both Eastern and Western religions. However, there certainly
are drawbacks to the functional approach as well. The line that substantive definitions of
religion draw between religion and secular is blurred, and often times completely erased
by functional definitions. Therefore, functional definitions of religion tend to be overinclusive. Some functional religions can allow for anything to be religion, thereby
making it difficult to decide what is religious and what is not.
Substantive Approach
A good example of a substantive definition of religion is provided by Steve Bruce
in Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (1996). Bruce defines
religion when he writes “Religion, then, consists of beliefs, actions, and institutions
which assume the existence of supernatural entities with powers of action, or impersonal
powers or processes possessed of moral purpose.”119 Bruce feels that this definition
“seems to encompass what ordinary people mean when they talk about religion.”120
When using a substantive understanding of religion, the proliferating sacred can be found
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in different manifestations, but this thesis will focus on two locales—traditional
institutional religion and New Religious Movements.
The first locale of the proliferating sacred is traditional institutional religion, such
as churches, mosques, temples, etc. Now, in order for secularization on the micro level to
go unchallenged, attendance at religious institutions should be in a state of decline, or at
least be at a lower level than the past. However, Christian Smith demonstrates, as
conveyed by James Cavendish, that “American evangelicalism is enjoying a level of
religious vitality—in terms of membership, attendance and participation, adherence to
and confidence in Christian beliefs, commitment to the mission of the Church, and
salience of faith—unmatched by other Christian traditions in the United States since the
year 2000.121 Thus, American Evangelicalism is one example, others being Roman
Catholicism and Pentecostalism, that “Christianity is not eroding, at least in any uniform,
linear fashion.”122 Christianity, however, is not the only institutional religious
resurgence. As Peter Berger recognizes, Islam is rapidly growing from North Africa to
Southeast Asia and from Europe to North America.123
The second locale of the proliferating sacred, in terms of the substantive
approach, is in New Religious Movements. If the secularization process is occurring on
the micro level, then New Religious Movements should be turning up with less
frequency. However, as J. Gordon Melton observes, “the appearance of new religions
has been fairly steady for over a generation [in America] . . . The rate of appearance in
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Europe has also equaled and in many cases surpassed that of the United States, indicating
that the growth of religious pluralism is not simply an American phenomenon, but is a
major trend in Western society.”124
Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge argue that this enduring popularity of New
Religious Movements (or “cults”) is a result of conventional religions becoming
somewhat weakened. Stark and Bainbridge point out that the weakening of conventional
religion is sometimes inaccurately used as evidence for secularization. However, as Stark
and Bainbridge argue, “no secular meaning system can provide such general explanations
about life that it replaces religion.”125 Thus, according to Stark and Bainbridge,
secularization on the macro level does not extend to the micro level, it just leads to
religious innovation and a time of new religions—New Religious Movements.
While the majority of Americans have not ever been members of New Religious
Movements, their cultural impact has been significant. As Lorne Dawson argues,
The religious landscape and consciousness of Americans have been irreversibly
changed and a new spiritual pluralism established. The denominational
accommodation between Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism that shaped
personal and collective identities in the period of prosperity immediately after the
Second World War (Herberg, 1955; Wuthnow, 1988) has been fractured
permanently by the sheer number of ever more conspicuous religious alternatives
. . . in the words of Robert Wuthnow (1988: 152) ‘it was as if the bits of mosaic
that had given shape to the religious topography had been thrown into the air,
never to land in exactly the same positions as before.’126
Thus, with a substantive understanding of religion, the proliferating sacred finds its
manifestation in non-institutional forms such as New Religious Movements, as well as in
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traditional institutional expressions of religion such as Christianity (with rises in
individual participation in Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant forms127).
Functional Approach
Now that it has been demonstrated that the proliferating sacred can be discovered
using a substantive understanding of religion, attention can be given to a functional
understanding of religion. Probably the most classic example of a functional definition of
religion is provided by Emile Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.
Here, Durkheim defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which
unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”128
It is the second part of Durkheim’s definition that is functional, religion unites people
into a single community. Thus, in order to locate the proliferating sacred in
contemporary society using a functional understanding of religion, this thesis will first
review Joseph Price’s work on sports and religion.
While there have been a number of texts that seriously engage the possible
religious function of sports, perhaps the most helpful work is From Season to Season:
Sports as American Religion (2001) by Joseph Price. In this work, Price provides a
compelling argument for sports functioning as religion in America. It is an anthology of
articles written by various scholars, with Price being the author of a few of them.
However, for purposes of this thesis, it is the conclusion, An American Apotheosis: Sports
as Popular Religion, that is of most importance. In this conclusion, Price does a review

127

Peter L Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, 6-9.
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated from the French by Joseph Ward
Swain, (Macmillan Publishing Co, New York: 1915), 62.
128

50

of literature that analyzes the religious function of sports in America, and he also offers
some observations on the religious nature of sports. In itself, Price’s study challenges the
secularization thesis, but when put into the context of Ellul’s theory, its significance
increases dramatically.
Towards the beginning of the chapter Price cites Joyce Carol Oates as writing,
“The decline of religion as a source of significant meaning in modern industrialized
society [secularization] has been extravagantly compensated by the rise of popular
culture in general, of which the billion-dollar sports mania is the most visible
manifestation.”129 This is an important observation because it demonstrates a scholar,
recognizing secular popular culture, sports specifically, fulfilling a social function that
had previously been allotted to religion. Price drives this point home more explicitly
when he writes,
For tens of millions of devoted fans throughout the country, sports constitute a
popular form of religion by shaping their world and sustaining their ways of
engaging it. Indeed, for many, sports are elevated to a kind of divine status, in
what I would call an American apotheosis.130
To add to these observations, Price cites the clever NPR affiliate Frank Deford as writing
the following statement in a Sports Illustrated article in the late 1970’s: “. . .if Marx had
lived at the end of the twentieth century in the United States rather than in Victorian
England, he would have declared sports the opiate of the people, anesthetizing them to
the class struggles and focusing their hopes on events that project fulfillment through a
vicarious form of participation and through an often delayed form of gratification.”131
While this may first strike one as humorous, as Deford’s observations typically do, it is a
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telling analysis of the seemingly religious function of sports for millions of Americans.
While there are certainly critics who argue that sports in no way contain the traditional
components of religion, Price counters by asserting, “Even though sports does not have
all characteristics of religion, neither does any particular religious tradition, because such
comprehensive definitions of religion are simply ideal norms against which actual
religions are measured.”132
After making these general observations and statements, Price then goes on to
analyze the experiential aspect of sports, which appears to have many affinities with
religious experience. To begin his analysis of experience, Price cites the psychologist
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s definition of religious experience as “. . .the state in which
people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter; the experience
itself is so enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake of doing
it.”133 Price then notes that experiences in sports can easily be described in the same way.
However, Price goes on further to cite Mircea Eliade’s studies of rituals in cosmological
culture. He points out that Eliade recognized the worldmaking [cosmicizing] functions of
ritual because ordinary space and ordinary time are suspended, thus the rituals replicate
cosmogonic acts.134 This interpretation is quite reminiscent of Ellul, but it lacks the
theoretic ground. Without the theoretic grounding, this is merely an interesting analogy
between ancient culture and contemporary culture. But what does the analogy mean?
Ellul recognizes that it is the proliferating sacred that causes this. Without Ellul, Price’s
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work is just an analogy based on Eliade’s studies. Ellul provides the theoretic ground
that allows for the broader study of postmodern culture.
Building on Eliade’s theory, theologian Michael Novak applies this notion of
religious rituals to sports rituals when he writes
They [sports] teach religious qualities of heart and soul. In particular, they
recreate symbols of cosmic struggle, in which human survival and moral courage
are not assured. Through their symbols and rituals, sports provide occasions for
experiencing a sense of ultimacy and for prompting personal transformation.135
It is for this reason that this thesis argues that sports constitute a form of cosmological
religion in contemporary America. Put another way, and in the context of Ellul, cultural
phenomena can, and do, reveal the proliferating sacred.
Along with the similarities in rituals and experiences found in sports and in
religion, Price offers many specific examples that can be given to support these ideas.
One great example is in the movie Bull Durham, with Kevin Costner and Tim Robbins.
At the opening of the movie a character in the movie named Annie Savoy gives her
“confession” when she says “I’ve tried ‘em all, I really have. And the only church that
truly feeds the soul day in and day out is the Church of Baseball.”136 While this may just
be a “Hollywood” example that some would argue is exaggerated for effect, in Price’s
more recent work, Rounding the Bases: Baseball and Religion in America (2006), he
cites countless examples of individuals understanding baseball in this fashion. One
example is J. Anthony Lukas, whose mother was manic depressive and committed
suicide when Lukas was at a very young age. Rather than turning to church for comfort
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and meaning, Lukas listened to the Yankees games broadcast over the radio. Lukas
recalls these times when he writes:
To millions of Americans the Yanks were arrogant. . .spoilsports who squeezed
all innocent joy from the game. But to an anxious youth still shaken by the
implosion of his ordered world, the masterful Yanks were vastly reassuring. If I
couldn’t control my environment, they surely dominated theirs. And by some
alchemy of fandom, their triumphs were mine as well.137
The preceding quote is a compelling anecdote of sports embodying the previously
explained understanding of the sacred offered by Jacques Ellul. Ellul argued, as
explicated earlier in this thesis that the three functions of the sacred were: to establish
order, to create sacred time, and to integrate an individual into a group. These three
functions are clearly present in Lukas’ recollection of what the Yankees did for him as a
troubled youth. It was the Yankees that made access to the sacred possible for Lukas, not
traditional religion. Price asserts this when he remarks, “In a way akin to a new
Christian’s experience of hope and security in the Kingdom of God, Lukas found the
victorious world of DiMaggio and Dickey, of Gordon and Keller, to be the realm of
deliverance that enabled the living out of routines and combating pain in the everyday
world.”138
With a plethora of other examples of stories much the same as the one of Lukas, it
is clear that sports do provide a prime example of the proliferating sacred in American
society. Price further expounds upon this when he writes, “The expressions of devotion
by fans are not restricted to fervent individuals; they also extend to communities that
often establish their identity by supporting their local team and celebrating its heroes.”139
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An example of this is “Hoosier Hysteria,” a term that describes the state of Indiana’s love
for basketball—which has actually been called the state’s religion.140 It is high school
basketball in Kentucky and high school football in Texas that demonstrates the sacred
component of sports. In Alabama, when Auburn and Alabama play football, in many
small towns across the state, all of the businesses close—and this is on a Saturday when
these businesses would do their greatest retail sales for the week.
The list of examples of the sacred component of sports in America goes on and
on. For as many sports teams as there are in America, there are hoards of fans to go
along with them as faithful followers. While the debate regarding the extent that sports
should be considered sacred and a form of religion in America is far from being
settled141, just turning one’s television to ESPN every Sunday night for a recap of the
day’s football games provides ongoing evidence of the sacred quality of sports. To end
this section, it is appropriate to cite Price one final time:
They [sports] exercise a power for shaping and engaging the world for millions of
devoted fans throughout America; they enable participants to explore levels of
selfhood that otherwise remain inaccessible; they establish means for bonding in
communal relations with other devotees; they model ways to deal with
contingencies and fate while playing by the rules; and they provide the prospect
for experiencing victory and thus, sampling, at least in an anticipatory way,
‘abundant life.’ In America, quite simply, sports constitute a form of popular
religion.142
In this quote, Price, albeit unknowingly, illustrates every function of the sacred Jacques
Ellul so explicitly spells out. Joseph Price is not alone.
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Conclusion
It is now important to reiterate the problem this thesis has attempted to address. Is
it accurate to label postmodern culture secular and has a more stable theoretic platform to
analyze religion in the postmodern world been provided? This thesis has contended that
postmodern culture is not secular and the many proponents of secularization fail to fully
address the role of religion in the postmodern world, typically by confining religion to
strictly institutional forms. Also, while critics of secularization, such as Rodney Stark,
are willing to cite New Religious Movements as evidence contra the secularization
process, the functional approach to religion has largely been overlooked. Thus, this
thesis has demonstrated that postmodern culture is best understood as religious by
providing a theoretical framework for analyzing contemporary society, via the work of
both Vincent Pecora and Jacques Ellul. Through analyzing each theorist’s work, it is
clear that separately, both Pecora and Ellul are quite helpful in postmodern studies;
however, when used together, their contributions are immeasurable.
In terms of this issue, Pecora is especially helpful. His conception of
secularization as a dialectical process, which is constantly doubling back on itself,
accounts for the presence of religion differently than other secularization theorists. It
does this because it uses a functional understanding of religion while traditional works on
secularization adhere to the substantive approach. It also takes seriously the power of
religion in postmodern society, albeit in a semantic form. However, Pecora still
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concludes that contemporary society is essentially secular; although it possesses a
significant semantic resonance of religion. Furthermore, Pecora’s elitist tendencies make
it difficult to gauge the extent of this semantic resonance.
Jacques Ellul is perhaps even more helpful, especially because of his notion of the
proliferating sacred. Because of this understanding, Ellul does not view society as
secular; rather, he finds it to be profoundly religious. By providing scholars with specific
forms and functions of the sacred, Ellul provides an important groundwork for analyzing
seemingly secular phenomena using religious categories. He also makes explicit what is
implicit in Pecora, and extends religious resonance to all of society, not just the elite.
While separately both Ellul and Pecora contribute a great deal to the academic
study of religion, it is clear that together they provide even more. Pecora accurately
provides a middle ground for evaluating the presence of religion in the context of
secularization. However, his notion of semantic resonance does not seem to adequately
account for the seemingly religious characteristics of phenomena traditionally understood
as secular, e.g., sports. Ellul’s understanding of the sacred provides the necessary
groundwork for studying these phenomena as functional equivalents to religion; however,
his work on secularization may not be quite as helpful as Pecora’s. While Pecora
provides a middle ground between the proponents and critics of secularization, Ellul is
another example of a dismissive critic.
Another contribution this thesis has attempted to make is to not only provide a
theoretical framework for analyzing contemporary society, but also to illustrate that this
methodological approach is already happening, most especially in studies of popular
culture. Part IV demonstrated that Joseph Price provides an example of an academic
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study of the relationship between sports and religion, which unknowingly seems to be
using this approach. However, Price is certainly not the only scholar doing this. From
works on the economy and consumerism by Dell deChant and Harvey Cox, to works on
sports by Shirl Hoffman and Robert J. Higgs and Michael C. Braswell, to works on
politics by Eric Voeglin and Jacques Ellul, to works on various elements of popular
culture by Michael Jindra, David Chidester, and Michelle Lelwica, seemingly secular
phenomena are being analyzed using categories of religion regularly.143 However, many
of these scholars analyze postmodern culture without the aid of a systematic theoretical
framework such as the one provided by this thesis.
Now one may be forced to ask: What does the argument of this thesis mean for
religion? Is the secularization thesis false? In short, yes—postmodern culture is not best
described as secular. I have attempted to sketch out possible alternatives to the standard
account of religion in the context of the secularization thesis. In this regard, my
alternative approach has sought to necessarily engage the issue of religion as an essential
aspect of human existence. While arguments regarding the possibility of the religious
impulse being innate to humans are far from being settled, the following observation
made by Pecora regarding contemporary culture appears to be accurate:
This [Verwindung] is not simply a function of language or geography but is
perhaps something to be acknowledged as the result of an irreducible set of needs
in human group psychology. One might then conclude that the society that
produces Enlightenment never fully outgrows its desire for religious sources of
coherence, solidarity, and historical purpose, and continually translates, or
143
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transposes them into ever more refined and immanent, but also distorted and
distorting, versions of its religious inheritance.144
This thesis agrees that the secularization thesis is an important body of literature
that must be taken seriously by any scholar attempting to do contemporary socio-cultural
analysis. However, it seems that theorists writing in support of secularization seem to
adopt an ideology of secularism (the intellectual standpoint that religion has already been
replaced by reason), thus any resurgence of religion, in its institutional form, is merely
explained away as an exception to the rule—Bruce’s rebuttal notwithstanding.
Conversely, critics of the secularization thesis search high and low for increases in
individual participation in religious institutions (usually Church attendance) to provide
evidence against the secularization thesis. What this thesis has attempted to do,
however, is provide grounding for another interpretation and another way of reading the
text of postmodern culture. In addition, it has offered one example of an apparent
resurgence of an alternative form of religion, sports, which is entirely consistent with and
fully accounted for in the context of this alternative approach. While religion certainly
has risen and fallen in sociological status throughout human history, it has never gone
away. For this reason, this analysis can be culminated with one final quote from Jacques
Ellul in describing the place of religion in society:
It is the irrational on the basis of which all the rest [religion] is constructed. The
moment one tries to eliminate it, it reappears in some other form. When one
curbs it on one side, it breaks out on the other.145
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